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 SITING FOREIGN LAW:                                       
HOW DERRIDA CAN HELP 
PIERRE LEGRAND* 
“I want to read what is, however, not written.” 
                                                         — Maurice Blanchot1 
 
Jacques Derrida was born to a Sephardic Jewish family near Algiers in 
1930, in what was then French Algeria (at school, says Derrida, there was 
“not a word about Algeria, not a single one about its history and its 
geography, whereas we could draw the coast of Brittany or the Gironde 
estuary with our eyes closed”).2 As a child, Derrida was the victim of harsh 
anti-Semitism, which translated into his expulsion from the local French 
primary school in 1942 along with all other Jewish students. Five years 
later, plagued by adolescent anxieties, he was unsuccessful on his first 
attempt at the baccalauréat or high-school leaving assessment. He later 
moved to France, where in 1950 he failed the entrance examination at the 
prestigious Ecole normale supérieure, France’s training school for teachers, 
and did not in fact succeed in being admitted to this institution for a further 
two years. His academic difficulties continued, and he subsequently 
foundered at the national concours d’agrégation, which would have 
accredited him as a philosophy teacher. Only in 1956 did he finally qualify. 
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 1. MAURICE BLANCHOT, L’ESPACE LITTERAIRE 257 (Gallimard 1955) (“Je veux lire ce qui n’est 
pourtant pas écrit”) (emphasis in original). 
 2. JACQUES DERRIDA, LE MONOLINGUISME DE L’AUTRE 76 (Galilée 1996) (“pas un mot sur 
l’Algérie, pas un seul sur son histoire et sur sa géographie, alors que nous pouvions dessiner les yeux 
fermés les côtes de Bretagne ou l’estuaire de la Gironde”). 
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Somewhat surprisingly given his checkered academic itinerary, within ten 
years or so Derrida had revealed himself as an extraordinarily gifted, 
challenging, and prolific philosophical mind. By the end of the 1970s, his 
work having been translated in numerous languages and his thought having 
found a receptive audience in a whole range of disciplines, Derrida had 
become the most influential voice within the crowded field of French 
philosophy. In 1998, the New York Times referred to him as “perhaps the 
world’s most famous philosopher—if not the only famous philosopher.”3 
Two documentary films were subsequently devoted to Derrida, which is 
perhaps another mark of his success. Jacques Derrida died in October 2004 
having taught in Paris for more than forty years, acted repeatedly as visiting 
professor at a substantial number of distinguished U.S. universities, and 
given conferences all over the world. In an op-ed piece published in the 
New York Times days after his death, it was said that “[a]long with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida  . . . will be 
remembered as one of the three most important philosophers of the 20th 
century.” The author aptly remarked that “[p]hilosophers, theologians, 
literary and art critics, psychologists, historians, writers, artists, legal 
scholars and even architects have found in his writings resources for 
insights that have led to an extraordinary revival of the arts and humanities 
during the past four decades.”4 
∞ 
I did not beseech Derrida. Rather, he came to me through the very 
good fortune of a key encounter with a colleague to whom I continue to 
feel profoundly indebted. When I began reading De la grammatologie, 
Marges, and Positions, I had been teaching law for five years and was 
becoming more disappointed by the day as too many colleagues, reducing 
their scholarly mandate to that of compliant expositor of the law, promised 
more clarity, more stability, more harmony than they could ever deliver. 
Unusually, I was a teacher who harbored an interest in foreign law. To be 
sure, if one is a Canadian wishing to graduate from Canada, as I fervently 
did even before entering law school in Montreal, one has little choice but to 
devote oneself to foreign law. Yet, I took the matter one step further and, 
influenced by one of my professors, formed the view that foreign law could 
hold a significant and indeed crucial measure of normative purchase for 
judges and lawyers operating locally. My first paper, which I began writing 
 
 3. Dinitia Smith, Philosopher Gamely in Defense of His Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, (May 30, 1998), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/30/arts/philosopher-gamely-in-defense-of-his-ideas.html. 
 4. Mark C. Taylor, What Derrida Really Meant, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 14, 2004),  available at http://   
www.nytimes.com/2004/10/14/opinion/14taylor.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1259848969-ukn969 
Q8ncl7q+zvHCwn9g.  
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after my initial year of law school, thus made the case for the transposition 
of a French precept to the law of obligations in Quebec through what I 
would now regard as some kind of Heideggerian leap. Given the way in 
which I was fashioning my scholarly life-in-the-law, I was rapidly—and 
willingly—instituted in an academic field known (problematically) as 
“comparative law.” This meant that when the time came to engage in 
postgraduate work, I found myself gravitating towards the Chair of 
Comparative Law at Oxford. This happened before “comparative law” had 
become cosmopolitan chic in Princeton and also before everyone would 
aspire to be a comparativist for fifteen lines. These were the days, in fact, 
when the Chair of Comparative Law at Oxford was still identified by his 
peers as an academic leader rather than as someone’s disciple. 
“Comparative law,” which, with hindsight, recognizably emerged in 
the 1820s, features, like other academic fields, its own learned societies, 
journals, conferences, chairs, research institutes, courses, and even its 
postgraduate programs. Of course, labels are in flux and words like 
“transnational” eventually made an appearance on the intellectual scene 
suggesting, perhaps, an alternative slant. Beyond fashionable designations, 
though, the pertinent research and teaching enterprises remain infused by 
one abiding concern, which is a determination to extol the value of the 
foreign in terms of what is relevantly legal locally. As is no doubt the case 
with every other field, “comparative law” boasts an orthodoxy. I have in 
mind established comparativists, those who edit the journals, are called 
upon by leading academic publishers to assess book proposals, secure large 
budgets to launch major research projects or fund new postgraduate 
programs, and direct centers or institutes. These comparativists function in 
a structuring capacity in that they uphold an identifiable regime of 
knowledge and information. On account of the institutional positions they 
hold, they defend what they regard as good comparative practice, that is, 
good comparative manners—or, which is another way of making the point, 
they promote themselves as good comparativists-at-law. Wanting to 
preserve the capital of authority they have acquired over the years, wishing 
to protect the credit they have built for themselves, and desiring in effect 
for time to stand still, orthodox comparativists are prone to exclude 
dissenters, those whose work is seen by them to be wavering and, 
paradoxically, to be competing with theirs for the assumption of 
institutional dominance, those whose comparation would accelerate the 
passage of time so that there occurs at last a displacement of the locus of 
institutional exemplarity. As Derrida underlines, what is deemed to be 
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“good writing has  . . . always been comprised,” that is, “enveloped.”5 
Allowing closure occasionally to recede just long enough to permit a nod to 
inclusivism, parts of the seventh edition of a leading U.S. casebook devoted 
to “comparative law” offer one illustration of how far the dogmatic 
architectonics within the field―nothing short of a fully-fledged process of 
censorship―can be taken. 
While I would not deny that every comparativist speaks in a voice 
which retains a measure of idiosyncrasy, despite being overdetermined 
institutionally and otherwise, I argue that orthodox comparativists largely 
share an approach to the law that can legitimately be designated as 
“positivism” or “legal positivism.” In brief, this technology of analytical 
knowledge can stand for the proposition that what counts as law is what is 
binding as law and that the interpreter’s task is to describe “that” without 
distortion. It follows that what should be made into an object of study as far 
as orthodox comparativists are concerned is precisely what is binding as 
law and that comparativism ought to attest to binding law through strictly 
conceptual, logical, and systematic expositions articulated neutrally, 
objectively, and “scientifically” with a view to strict exactitude. 
Traditionally, positivism’s focus on bindingness had meant that “law” was 
to be strictly equated with the law in force within a given jurisdiction. One 
of the major emancipatory achievements of “comparative law” since its 
institutional inception has been to widen the range of positivism, to include 
foreign positivisms within the legitimate province of “law” as an object of 
study, mostly manifesting themselves at the national level. This has been 
accomplished despite the obvious fact that foreign law is in principle 
devoid of any binding character beyond its own jurisdictional confines. 
But such deterritorialization has remained limited to a strictly 
geographical motion. In particular, it has failed to extend to a 
deterritorialization of the mind that would have taken “comparative law” 
beyond technical ingenuity and mathematical subtlety and would have led 
comparativists to develop an understanding of law adequate to the task of 
cross-border investigations. Instead, comparativists, unable to escape the 
“system” into which they were institutionalized, have simply projected 
onto the international scene the positivism that they were used to practicing 
within their “own” law (as if law belonged . . .). In other words, while 
orthodox comparativists are indeed occupying the pan-national stage, they 
remain unrepentant positivists committed as ever to a conception of the law 
 
 5. JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE  30 (Editions de Minuit 1967) (“[l]a bonne 
écriture a . . . toujours été comprise”/“envelopp[é]e”) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter DERRIDA, 
GRAMMATOLOGIE]. 
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as binding law and determined as always to limit their work to “that,” to the 
law that is binding. To this day, then, published comparative research 
continues to be squarely focused on statutes and reported appellate 
decisions―on what has been posited by relevant officials as “the law.” A 
prominent U.S. comparativist, in my view very much expressing himself as 
pars pro toto, thus felt able to write as follows in 2007: “I am concerned 
with what the law [i]s.” I claim that this statement exemplifies the 
governing view within the field of “comparative law,” which accordingly 
operates as a form of market-led, breathless technical/practical service 
rather than as cogitative scholarship, hence the disenchantment I expressed 
above. What we get is not rigor, but rigor mortis. 
But what is wrong with addressing statutes and judicial decisions? 
Why is legal positivism problematic for comparative legal studies? In a 
nutshell, my argument is that it is impossible simply to transfer beyond 
borders an approach to the legal which prevails locally because 
primordially different considerations obtain in those two situations. At the 
local level, the creation of a harmonious legal environment in the name of 
values such as predictability and certainty may well call, in the end, for the 
elimination of discordance. Consider how a judge strives to ensure that her 
decision does not contradict legislation and how she attempts to reconcile it 
with opinions already written by other judges. And observe how the author 
of a textbook likewise purports to syncretize all judicial decisions on a 
given topic, to ensure that somehow they all fit together and that they do 
not contradict one another. Throughout, the dominant values are very much 
those of predictability and certainty. The last thing that French or German 
lawyers operating in France or Germany want is the kind of cacophony that 
would make it difficult to ascertain what the law in force states on any 
given point at any given time.6 
Is the situation not precisely the same on the transnational scene? For 
legal agents engaging in legal analysis that involves more than one law, it 
is arguable that predictability and certainty matter as much in that context 
as they do locally. Thus, I do not wish to dispute the affinity that can be 
claimed between the two sets of circumstances in this regard. But it is the 
 
 6. This argument is usefully developed by Rodolfo Sacco, who writes that “[o]ne tends to see, 
within a legal order, the will of the legislator, who creates the norm, and scholarship and judicial 
decisions that interpret and apply this will. In principle, the various rules (legal, scholarly, or judicial) 
should be identical. If there is a difference, it must be ascribed to an error on the part of the interpreter.” 
RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 47 (UTET, 5th ed. 1992) (“si tende a 
vedere, all’interno di un ordinamento, una volontà del legislatore, che crea la norma, e una dottrina ed 
una giurisprudenza che interpretano e applicano questa volontà. Le varie regole (legale, dottrinale, 
giudiziaria) sarebbero, in via di principio, identiche. Se una difformità esiste, ciò si deve imputare ad 
un errore dell’interprete”). 
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case that irrespective of the relevance of predictability and certainty in 
cross-border settings, these values have to contend with a competing set of 
ideas that are specific to dynamics involving the foreign. I have in mind the 
premises that always already need to inform any relationship between self 
and other, specifically between self-in-the-law and other-in-the-law, 
between the self’s law and the other’s law. For me, these primordial 
notions go under the names of “recognition” and “respect” (which need not 
entail complaisance to fundamentalist regimes or agreement with rain 
dances). They attest to the fact that the other is not just another self, that he 
cannot be reduced to an alter ego. In the process, they incline the self to 
resist hegemonic or totalitarian thinking (which is not to be apprehended as 
a strictly Nazi or Stalinist phenomenon) and to avoid positioning himself as 
that by reference to which the other ought to be assessed. While univocality 
may be desirable locally, the exigencies set by the co-presence of the 
foreign in cross-national situations firmly demand equivocality. 
My basic contention, then, is that the foreign makes especial claims on 
one. For the Anglophone reader, the poetry of Char in French or of Celan 
in German creates an interpretive situation which challenges him in a 
manner that differs from, say, the way in which does Blake’s poetry. 
Within cross-national dynamics, in a situation where one is dealing with a 
law that is not one’s “own,” with a law that is, in effect, someone else’s, 
certain protocols imperatively need to be implemented in order to avoid the 
surfeit of ethnocentricity that is liable to discredit the comparative analysis. 
One could say that the matter concerns the formulation of an ethics 
responding edifyingly to the specific type of summons conjured by the co-
presence of the other. Surprisingly, I should think, one observes that this 
attitude represents but a minoritarian stance within comparative legal 
studies. Thus, in 1995, a leading U.S. comparativist, someone whom I 
situate firmly within the comparative orthodoxy, felt able to write, “[t]here 
[is] nothing distinctively German, French or American about [German, 
French, or American judicial] decisions.” For his part, an influential 
German comparativist who, in the published English translation of his 
work, declares the “immaterial[ity] of differences across laws” and 
proclaims a “unitary sense of justice,” offers a further illustration of the 
established perspective. While these opinions faithfully exemplify the 
orthodoxy within the field of “comparative law,” they fail―rather 
abysmally―to do justice to the singularity of the laws that are other than 
one’s “own.” What we have instead is a not-so-discreet ethnocentric 
projection allowing one to say that the various laws under scrutiny, not 
being different from one another in ways that matter, are in effect like 
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one’s “own,” which entails, most conveniently, that one need not call one’s 
law (or oneself) into question. 
But the demonstrably empirical fact is that if there is more than one 
law, there is difference across laws. It is not a matter of whether difference 
is there or not, for it exists. It is about what the comparativist will make of 
the difference that exists. Will he try to efface it on account of its 
inconvenience to his research program? Will he try to ignore it? Along 
these lines, a well-known comparativist-at-law wrote in 1995 that 
comparativists ought to engage in the “manipulation” of data in order to 
make laws look similar. Or will the comparativist, in the name of 
recognition and respect for the other’s law, try to do justice to difference-
at-law through an examination of the matrices within which laws are 
ensconsed? Will a comparativist accept, for example, that if the French 
legislature will not allow the wearing of conspicuous religious dress at 
school, there are historical, political, social, demographic, and 
epistemological reasons for this decision, which deserve to be elucidated as 
law if one is to get a meaningful understanding of the relevant French 
statute? And will the comparativist acknowledge that if the Supreme Court 
of Canada will allow a  twelve year-old Sikh to wear his ceremonial metal 
dagger (or “kirpan”) at school, there are, also, historical, political, social, 
demographic, and epistemological reasons for this determination, which 
deserve to be elucidated as law if one is to get a meaningful understanding 
of the Canadian decision? For those who prefer corporate law with their 
dinner, I can offer an analogous argument with respect to the rights of 
minority shareholders. In the United States and in the United Kingdom, the 
crucial determinant of the legality of management action has been 
“shareholder interest.” To decide what management can do to combat a 
take-over attempt, for instance, judges ask themselves whether the best 
interests of shareholders are being served. In France, the criterion is 
different. French judges examine not shareholder interest but the interest of 
the company as a whole, what is known as “intérêt social” (or “social 
interest”). This distinction is not insignificant. One can easily imagine, for 
instance, management attempting to foil a take-over bid in the interest of 
the company as a whole (which they happen to be managing) while the bid 
would benefit individual shareholders.7 My claim is that, just as with 
religious dress at school, what we have here is more than one model of 
corporate governance, each being informed by historical, political, social, 
philosophical, and epistemological considerations, which require to be 
 
 7. See Ben Clift, French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of 
Change and Hybridisation Within Models of Capitalism, 55 POL. STUD. 546 (2007). 
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elucidated as law if one is to get a meaningful understanding of, say, the 
U.S. or French law of corporate governance. 
Does positivism or legal positivism assist the comparativist in 
capturing this constitutive dimension of the law, which, incidentally, will 
be found to prove singular to each law? Positivism is inherently about 
determining what law is and what is law. It is concerned with 
circumscribing what counts as “law.” This is what, structurally, positivism 
would be in a position to accomplish. As regards foreign law, then, 
positivism can allow one only to identify the law in force. It cannot do more 
than that and cannot reasonably be expected or made to do more than that. 
When it comes to foreign law, positivism is thus seen to behave in 
stubbornly static and documentary fashion. How can a comparativist who 
is operating across borders and addressing a law that is not his “own,” a 
law which is an other’s law and another law, a law which requires to be 
understood, which calls for ascription of meaning, how can such a 
comparativist, then, be content with a mere process of identification? 
Imagine that I am teaching U.S. students in California, and that I am 
trying to get them to make sense of the French statute on religious dress at 
school, which they initially regard as excessive, intolerant, and contrary to 
what they envisage as freedom of religion. How do I help the case for 
understanding if I engage in a positivistic re-presentation of the French 
statute? What good is it for me to rehearse how the French courts have 
interpreted the word “schools” or what meaning, broad or narrow, textbook 
writers have assigned to the expression “religious signs”? Will I get my 
U.S. students to deepen their understanding of the French statute to the 
point where, although they are likely to continue to disagree with it on 
account of their situation within a multicultural society, they can at least get 
to appreciate it? The answer, it seems to me, is negative: positivism will 
simply not allow me to generate such sensitivity for the foreign. 
Of course, to ascertain what counts as “law” can be regarded as a 
necessary first step, which the comparativist would be hard-pressed to 
avoid.8 It is law that we lawyers have made our concern, and as one moves 
into foreign legal territory one evidently needs to determine where “law” is 
to be found to exist and what it says. Yet, precisely because one is dealing 
with the foreign, it would be unacceptably reductionist to confine one’s 
 
 8. But see Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal 
Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 13 n. 37 (1997): “I do not wish to enter into the largely sterile and 
boring discussion of what can be considered law.” While it is hard to comprehend why a comparativist-
at-law would openly want to identify himself with such philistinism under any set of circumstances, the 
inclusion of this statement in an essay devoted to the classification of laws makes matters especially 
difficult even for the benevolent reader. 
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encounter with the “legal” to a process of formal identification. As an 
account of foreign law, mere identification of what that law is, of what it 
says, will not do. A more complex form of understanding is needed. And 
this claim cannot be reduced to an esoteric argument concerning the 
academic practice of “comparative law.” It raises, rather, a crucial political 
issue. To summarize, positivism is predicated upon an anterior practical 
view of the world and of the law. Given the way in which it strategically 
seeks to work itself pure under cover of science, such that certain 
information is mechanistically excluded from the sphere of relevance and 
some questions made never to arise, it is obvious that positivism harbors a 
specific disposition, that it assumes a (political) position no matter how 
much it strives to disclaim any interest in law’s political governance (any 
positing is someone’s positing, which means that not even exegesis can be 
presuppositionless). My dissatisfaction with “comparative law”’s 
smothering artifices stems from the fact that I find its sclerotic political 
position intellectually indefensible and ethically untenable. I argue, then, 
that “comparative law” requires a different politics. I have, in fact, been 
making this case for more than fifteen years safe in the knowledge that the 
battle for an alternative “comparative law” would confine me, as a nomadic 
theorist and a theoretical nomad, to a marginal itinerancy at the periphery 
of the field. As was to be expected, orthodox comparativists have been 
content to discredit my work or ignore it.9 To be sure, I could simply have 
left the field and, rather than obstinately inscribe my protest when offered 
the opportunity to do so, have made my intellectual life elsewhere (which I 
want to continue thinking I may yet do). As I have been pursuing my 
challenge to the orthodoxy in favor of a different economy of knowledge 
better suited to the polyvocality and equivocality characteristic of the cross-
border legal scene, I have found Derrida to be supplying a unique brand of 
intellectual assistance, at once discerning and indefectible. To those who, in 
response to this statement, are preparing to abridge their reading of this 
paper on the assumption that Derrida, qua philosopher, cannot have 
anything worthwhile to contribute to “comparative law,” I retort that such 
inference is about as informed as that of a traductologist who would deny 
 
 9. I am referring strictly to “orthodox comparativists.” At times, their omissions have proved 
caricatural enough to attract scholarly attention thus confirming the fact that being ignored can lead to 
an alternative form of existence. See, e.g., Peter Goodrich, Intellection and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. SOC’Y 
460, 474 (2009). See also Mathias M. Siems, Book Review, 12 EDINBURGH L. REV. 334, 335 (2008) 
(reviewing ESIN ÖRÜCÜ & DAVID NELKEN, COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (2007)). Having noted 
Siems’s text for present purposes, I would not want to be taken to endorse its crude statistical 
apprehension of the matter of relevance, which I find simplistic and, well, vulgar. 
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Luther’s relevance because he was a theologian or of an anthropologist 
who would object to Saussure’s pertinence since he was a linguist. 
Admittedly, law was not Derrida’s principal interest; however, he 
worked tirelessly on texts and on interpretation. And since law, including 
foreign law, can reasonably be said largely to consist of texts (even on a 
narrow definition of the word “text”)―for example, the text of the statute, 
of the judicial decision, of the treatise, or of the law-review article―and 
because what we do as comparativists as we interact with foreign law is in 
substantial part to interpret texts, Derrida’s work on texts, more than forty 
years of it, deserves our attention. I unhesitatingly accept that other 
contemporary thinkers have also made major contributions to our 
understanding of texts. I have in mind, for instance, such key intellectuals 
as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricœur, and Stanley Fish. But Derrida, in 
addition to his work on texts and interpretation, conducted in parallel a 
further reflection, extending over all of these forty years also, on the 
relationship between self and other, on ethnocentricity and otherness (of 
course, anyone at all familiar with the cultural claustrophobia within which 
French academia remains mired can easily see how, as a North-African Jew 
living in Paris, he would have felt personally concerned). Indeed, in the 
very first sentence of one of his first three major books, all published in 
1967, Derrida explicitly foregrounded ethnocentrism. 
In order to appreciate the merit of Derrida’s contribution to a more 
sophisticated understanding of texts against the background of the 
relationship between self and other, I hasten to add that there is no need to 
turn oneself into some ventriloquizing disciple of his. Personally, I regard 
myself as a reader of Derrida, which means, for one thing, that I feel 
entitled to behave rather as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does 
vis-à-vis Niklas Luhmann: I can close a book of Derrida’s after having read 
two chapters only (and not necessarily consecutive ones at that), go for a 
walk in the Jardin du Luxembourg, and upon returning to my study open a 
different book, possibly written by some other intellectual.10 My point is 
that one can easily take the view that Derrida’s insights in interpretive 
matters and as regards the self/other dynamics are worthy of serious 
consideration, and may deserve to be received as theoretical investigations 
warranting translation into a textual praxis, without embracing the French 
philosopher’s world-view in all its ramifications. In any event, Derrida’s 
philosophy was never meant to be systematic, that is, it was never intended 
 
 10. For the thoughtful expression of his connection with Luhmann, on which I draw, see 
ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, NIKLAS LUHMANN: LAW, JUSTICE, SOCIETY 1-2 (2009). 
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to form a finished system in which each term would be precisely defined 
and situated. 
As I try to account for Derrida’s engagement with texts and with 
otherness, to assist progress through Derridean foothills and mountains, 
especially as steep escarpments present themselves, I propose to organize 
my thoughts around eight key clusters of ideas. Inevitably, I base my 
account on Derrida’s philosophy as I read it. Although I would not perform 
anything that I do not perceive as being already there, in Derrida’s work, 
waiting to be brought forth, while I would not consciously embellish or 
deface Derrida’s text, I proffer my Derrida―not unlike the way in which a 
violonist who plays Paganini’s “Caprices” remains at once compliant with 
the score and yet injects interpretive idiomaticity in the course of her 
performance.11 After all, reading, even silent reading, like playing the 
violin, is an activity and an intervention―it is something that one 
does―and it therefore begets an account which cannot be merely 
constative. It is, then, to my experience of Derrida that I now turn. 
On the Surface 
As he approaches the text, Derrida’s first interpretive motion looks 
anything but revolutionary. Indeed, he suggests a reproductive reading 
along the lines of a “duplicating commentary.”12 He thus notes “the 
necessity of first ascertaining a surface or manifest meaning . . . : the 
necessity of gaining a good understanding, in a quasi-scholastic way, 
philologically and grammatically, by taking into account the dominant and 
stable conventions” of authorship which manifest themselves “on the . . . 
surface of [the] text.”13 But for Derrida, ascription of meaning cannot stop 
at this conventional stage; rather, it must involve a “double gesture.”14 His 
second operation boldly wants to be productive and critical. It is not that 
the “declared intention is . . . annulled . . . but rather [that it is] inscribed 
within a system which it no longer dominates.”15 At this juncture, Derrida, 
 
 11. I deliberately inscribe a reference, albeit distant, to NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 
(1976). 
 12. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 227 (“commentaire redoublant”). 
 13. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE WORK OF MOURNING 84 (Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
eds., Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas transl. 2001) (1991). It must not be thought that, as regards 
the first step in his strategy of interpretation, Derrida simply assumes basic semantic determinacy. 
Indeed, he observes that “[i]ntention is at once differing and deferred”: JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED 
INC. 111 (Galilée 1990) (“L’intention est a priori (aussi sec) différante”) (emphasis in original) 
[hereinafter DERRIDA, LIMITED]. See infra on Derrida’s idea of “differance” (“différance”). 
 14. DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 50 (“double geste”). 
 15. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 345 (“[l]’intention déclarée n’est pas annulée 
mais inscrite dans un système qu’elle ne domine plus”) (emphasis in original). 
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controversially, takes the view that “the self-identity [of the text] is always 
withdrawing and displacing itself.”16 I devote the remainder of this essay to 
an explication of this other dimension of interpretation, which, as 
understood by Derrida, achieves at once the destabilization and 
dissemination of meaning. 
About Presence 
Somewhat unthinkingly, the identity of a text is predicated upon a 
conception of presence as visibility. Derrida challenges our habitual 
understanding that the presence of the text―what is present as text―can be 
reduced in this fashion to the text’s graphical dimension. In the process, he 
calls for a different politics of memory and suggests that the text be 
envisaged otherwise and, in my words, other-wise―that is, in a manner 
that would be more conducive to the endless negotiation with the other that 
it necessarily affirms, if discreetly. Simply put, the notion of “presence” is 
more complicated than what we have been assuming. What is visible is, of 
course, present. Thus, the words on the page are evidently an important part 
of the presence of the text. But graphematic substance is not all there is to 
the presence of a text. The text, if you will, does not coincide with its 
graphic surface. Specifically, something can be present as text―and indeed 
be a fully-fledged, constitutive, part of the text―even though not 
graphically visible. By way of analogy, consider Véronique at the café. 
When we were dating, we used to go to L’Ecritoire often. This was a long 
time ago. Yet, when I find myself in that café, I can still see her there, 
sitting at our favorite table. I am not talking of the kind of presence that 
readily comes to mind when we mention presence, that is, I am not 
referring to physical presence. But I am certainly not adverting to absence 
either. Although invisibly so, Véronique is present in the room. She haunts 
the café. Texts, too, are haunted. In the same manner as the café is not the 
(physical) room, as it is not in effect confined to that room (it includes 
Véronique, who is not physically at the café), “the text is not the book”―it 
is not limited to the book: it “comprises and does not therefore exclude the 
world,” it embraces “the other.”17 
Of Spectrality and the Trace 
Derrida’s claim is that a text consists of its visible dimension―this 
would be the graphical part of it―and that it is also made of an invisible 
 
 16. Id. at 72 (“l’identité à soi du [texte] se dérobe et se déplace sans cesse”). 
 17. DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 253 (“le texte n’est pas le livre”/ “comprend et n’exclut 
donc pas le monde”/“l’autre”). 
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aspect. This constitutive, imperceptible element, he calls the “trace” in the 
sense of sign/clue―a notion which he derives from Emmanuel Levinas.18 
Derrida’s argument is that a text is but “a fabric of traces.”19 In addition to 
its graphical features, a text, being irreducibly relational, or being always 
already inscribed in the world (no one can even imagine a text existing “in 
the air”), is constituted of a unique if intricate assemblage of an infinite 
number of unique traces. To be sure, these heterogeneous traces 
assembled―this singular plural―do not leap to the interpreter’s eye, but 
they are there: they do haunt the text. Derrida thus urges us to accept that 
there is a “spectral” dimension to texts. He wants us to think of traces as 
ghosts (the ghost is present, although invisible). These traces are the 
precipitate or the deposit left, for example, by history, politics, or 
philosophy. They are what history, politics, or philosophy survives as; they 
are history, politics, or philosophy’s remains―Derrida refers to ashes or 
cinders.20 In this sense, the traces indicate the presence of other discourses 
of which they are the vestiges, which they retain (a trace is “retentional”),21 
which they iterate (“iteration” is an important Derridean motif, designating 
repetition-with-a-difference: the trace is not the same thing as that of which 
it is the remainder), whose staying power they manifest, even as they show 
themselves to be unstable and transient rather than monumental and 
permanent. Somewhat mystically perhaps, Derrida associates the 
identification or naming of the remains, of the traces, to a work of 
mourning: the thought of the trace involves acceptance of death at work 
within life.22 In his words, “[d]eath strolls between the letters.”23 
By way of application of Derrida’s argument, consider the French 
statute on religious dress at school. It is, of course, constituted of the words 
that we see on the page―such is its graphical presence―but it is also made 
of the traces that have been left by history, politics, or philosophy. 
 
 18. For an acknowledgment of his indebtedness, see DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 
102-03. 
 19. JACQUES DERRIDA, PARAGES 118 (2d ed., Galilée 2003) (1979) (“un tissu de traces”). This 
text first appeared in English as Jacques Derrida, Living On, in HAROLD BLOOM ET AL., 
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 62-142 (James Hulbert transl. 2004) (1979). 
 20. According to Derrida, “the best paradigm for the trace . . . is not . . . the trail of the hunt, the 
fraying, the furrow in the sand, the wake in the sea, the love of the step for its imprint, but the cinder.” 
JACQUES DERRIDA, FEU LA CENDRE  27 (Editions des Femmes 1987) (“le meilleur paradigme de la 
trace, . . . ce n’est pas . . . la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon dans le sable, le sillage dans la mer, 
l’amour du pas pour son empreinte, mais la cendre”). 
 21. JACQUES DERRIDA, LA VOIX ET LE PHENOMENE  95 (Presses Universitaires de France 1967) 
(“rétentionnelle”) [hereinafter DERRIDA, VOIX]. 
 22. One of Derrida’s books bears that title. See supra note 13. 
 23. JACQUES DERRIDA, L’ECRITURE ET LA DIFFERENCE  108 (Le Seuil 1967) (“La mort se 
promène entre les lettres”) [hereinafter DERRIDA, ECRITURE]. 
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Specifically, it is haunted by the history of the relationship between 
churches and state as it has developed in France since the early fourteenth 
century; by nineteenth-century French colonial politics in North Africa; by 
a contemporary conception of “Republican citizenship” prohibiting the idea 
of minority rights; and by an epistemological distinction between the 
“public” and the “private” harking back to Roman law. In other words, “[a] 
text  . . . is simultaneously the condensation of a scarcely delimitable 
history . . ., of the encyclopedia”; in it “can be gathered the greatest 
potentiality of historical, theoretical, linguistic, philosophical culture.”24 It 
bears emphasizing that the traces, in all their polyvocality and equivocality, 
are constitutive of the text and that they cannot therefore be withdrawn 
from the text and find themselves relegated to the text’s context or 
parergon, somewhere on the wrong side of the disciplinary palisades. The 
statute exists as the history of the relationship between churches and state, 
as colonial politics in North Africa, and so forth. Strictly speaking, 
therefore, and in Derrida’s own famous words, “[i]l n’y a pas de hors-
texte,” which is to say, for one thing, that there is nothing which, 
dogmatically, can be pronounced to lie in a beyond of the text.25 
Accordingly, any act of closure (recall legal positivism’s strategy) is 
inadequate in the sense that it necessarily excludes something yet to be 
thought through in its textual relevance. Ultimately, the claim regarding 
traces is structural in the sense that the traces inhere to the text; they pertain 
to the very making of it. Try as he may, a positivist cannot get this structure 
to disappear. He may opt to ignore it,26 but he cannot eliminate it. Indeed, 
to ignore the trace is to close one’s eyes to what is always already there. 
For Derrida, then, there is a law of spectrality at work―“the spectral 
structure is the law here”27―which means that what legal positivism would 
frame as radical exteriority vis-à-vis the text or as absence from the text, 
such as history, politics, or philosophy, is shown not to be exterior to it or 
absent from it after all (Véronique is not not-at-the-café). Because the 
textual matrix exists as a reticulation of traces (Derrida talks of “the 
adventure of the text as weed”),28 each trace being different from all others, 
it thus exists as a differential matrix: “Textuality [is] constituted by 
 
 24. JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE 43 (Derek Attridge ed. 1992). 
 25. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 227 (“There is no out-of-text”). This passage 
appears in italics in the French original. 
 26. Cf. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE 6 (2006): “It is no mystery that law is part of 
culture, but it is not uncommon for those who, by profession or context, are deeply involved in a given 
legal system to act as if ‘The Law’ is quite separable from other elements of cultural life.” 
 27. JACQUES DERRIDA, PAPIER MACHINE 307 (Galilée 2001) (“la structure spectrale fait ici la 
loi”). 
 28. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 102 (“l'aventure du texte comme mauvaise herbe”). 
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differences and by differences from differences.”29 And the text therefore 
operates to fasten or bind or band the traces as they come together to 
constitute it (as, say, traces of history enmeshed with traces of politics or of 
philosophy become a statute).30 The mark of a process of condensation or 
agglutination, the text takes the form of a gathering. 
To return specifically to law-texts, the motifs of “spectrality” and 
“trace” eschew the unduly crude binary distinction between law and non-
law (the kind of dualism which Derrida, throughout his decades of writing, 
consistently derided as “metaphysical”). They reveal that law does not exist 
in isolation from other discourses but is affected by them as regards its very 
constitution: it is constructed, made, fabricated, assembled, actively 
constituted of them. In sum, spectrality marks “the relation of the intimacy 
of the living present to its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, 
upon the non-self.”31 It should be clear that we have here a very different, 
much more capacious, interpretation of what it must mean to interpret a 
law-text.32 There is one additional point. Since they are invisible, the traces 
await their unfolding or elucidation or unconcealment―their bringing 
forth―by the text’s interpreter who, as he undertakes this archival work, is 
required to engage in an anamnesis, indeed in a hypermnesis (a recollection 
or recollective thinking, as opposed to an amnesia or forgetting), thus 
deploying a sensibility that is in crucial ways more akin to that of the 
archeologist’s than the mathematician’s. Only by staging the traces—a 
gesture featuring a transacted, kinetic, and performative dimension even as 
it purports to abide by the text—can the interpreter (say, the comparativist) 
affirm the life of the law-text by giving the traces their due, by doing 
justice to the traces, which, as survivancies, have come to constitute the 
text. (Note, however, that even the “bringing forth” of traces will fail to 
generate the text’s full presence.) 
 
 
 29. JACQUES DERRIDA, LA DISSEMINATION  111 (Le Seuil 1972) (“la textualité étant constituée de 
différences et de différences de différences”). 
 30. In French, Derrida repeatedly uses the verb “bander” as in “le texte bande.” Now, “bander” in 
familiar French is to have an erection. Derrida’s pun is that as the text proceeds to band the traces, it 
allows itself to stand, erect, as text. See JACQUES DERRIDA, GLAS 151b (Galilée 1974): “I suggest that 
we try everywhere to replace the verb to be by the verb to band”) (“je propose qu’on essaie partout de 
remplacer le verbe être par le verbe bander”) (emphasis in original). 
 31. DERRIDA, VOIX, supra note 21, at 96 (“le rapport de l’intimité du présent vivant à son dehors, 
l’ouverture à l’extériorité en général, au non-propre”). See also JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITIQUE ET 
AMITIE 107 (Michael Sprinker ed., Galilée 2011) (1993). 
 32. In DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 427, Derrida expressly refers to “two interpretations 
of interpretation” (“deux interprétations de l’interprétation”). 
LEGRAND_PROOF_2 7/12/2011  4:13:27 PM 
610 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:595 
On Unconcealment 
Etymologically, the word “text,” in addition to evoking authority (the 
Scriptures, especially the Gospels, are known as the “Holy Text” or, 
simply, the “Text”), connotes the idea of weaving and, more extensively, of 
interlacement. In Rome, a “textor” was indeed a weaver and “texere” was 
“to weave” (consider the word “textile”). Now, this intermingling of traces 
(or threads) whereby texts are woven or fabricated is something that 
happens irrespective of the interpreter of the text and yet requires the 
interpreter of the text in order to happen. Looking at the matter from the 
interpreter’s standpoint, he can be seen to act as an inventor, which, 
literally, means that he is simultaneously a finder (someone discovering the 
traces which are there as the text) and a creator (someone elucidating the 
traces that are there as the text, bringing them to light, fashioning them). 
Consider, again, the French statute on religious dress at school. This statute 
is haunted by traces of French colonial politics and Roman law. These 
traces are there as the statute; in inevitable ways, they are the statute. And 
they are the statute irrespective of any comparativist coming along to 
ascribe meaning to the statute (“[t]he trace is not an attribute”).33 In other 
words, the statute exists as a text featuring traces of French colonialism and 
of Romanitas whether or not there is a comparativist around. Yet, without 
the comparativist, these traces, which are “necessarily occulted,”34 are 
doomed to a kind of mutism. They signify, but they do so in silence. In this 
sense, they are destined to remain without effective meaning, that is, 
effectively meaning-less. Again, the idea of “invention” accounts for the 
fact that the comparativist will have at once found and made foreign law, 
that he will have simultaneously identified and configured it. 
It is the comparativist-at-law who, by going underground in order to 
explore the text’s rhizomes, awakens meaning, brings the traces into 
interpretive existence, makes the traces actively mean, attributes dynamic 
meaning to them, acts as an enabler of resonant meaning, makes the traces 
meaning-ful. As he engages in this act of elevation to fully-fledged 
meaning, the comparativist is, strictly speaking, involved in a process of 
iteration, which takes us back to my earlier point about “invention.” While 
the comparativist reproduces what there is out of fidelity to the 
text―Derrida insists that “the reading  . . . cannot legitimately transgress 
 
 33. DERRIDA, VOIX, supra note 21, at 95 (“La trace n’est pas un attribut”). 
 34. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 69 (“nécessairement occulté[es]”). 
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the text towards something other than itself”35―he inevitably proceeds in 
his own (situated) key. Along the way, he brings to bear his own familiarity 
with the law that he has made into his object of study, which will indeed 
act as an index of his rhetorical ability to persuade his interlocutors or his 
readership of the merit of his elucidation. For instance, a comparativist will 
fail to realize the presence of traces of French colonial politics haunting the 
French statute on religious dress at school unless he is in a position to apply 
a sound knowledge of French history, French politics, French philosophy, 
French society, French international affairs, in sum, of French culture―an 
undertaking which need not fall prey to the trappings of essentialism. There 
follows an important implication, no doubt profoundly disturbing for legal 
positivism’s allegedly secure but spectacularly self-aggrandizing 
conceptual assumptions, which is that, strictly speaking, foreign law is not 
simply discovered: it is also achieved. And this fashioning produces a legal 
knowledge that can only be situated in relation to a certain epistemological 
framework embedded in place and time―interpretation proceeds from 
prejudice, from a pre-understanding which, even as it makes emergence of 
knowledge possible, also acts to constrain what can manifest itself as 
knowledge. In other words, it is impossible for a comparativist to work 
referentially only, that is, to operate exclusively by making reference to 
something that would be there, without injecting any added value of his 
own. Foreign law, therefore, bears the comparativist’s “singular signature” 
and appears as nothing short of an “autobiographical inscription.”36 
Discreetly perhaps, in silence even, writing in white ink, so to speak, no 
matter how seemingly self-effacing or external to the matter, the 
comparativist is actively at work―inescapably so―within the formation of 
foreign law and is continuously bringing his pre-understanding into play in 
order to structure it. Not only is he producing foreign law but he is 
producing himself. It follows that there are potentially as many French 
statutes on religious dress at school as there will be comparativists coming 
to the matter of interpretation of the relevant law-text. Yes, yes. Now, the 
fact is, which Derrida never tired of emphasizing, that the moment one 
articulates anything about something, one does violence to it. No matter 
how purportedly loyal my detailed account of my conversation with 
Imogene, I will distort our exchange and, in this way, do violence to it (of 
 
 35. Id. at 227 (“[La lecture] ne peut légitimement transgresser le texte vers autre chose que lui”). 
See also Jacques Derrida, Countersignature, 27/2 PARAGRAPH 7, 28-29 (2004)  (Mairéad Hanrahan 
transl. 2000). 
 36. DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE, supra note 24, at 43. This point is excellently argued in 
Raluca Bercea, Toute comparaison des droits est une fiction, in COMPARER LES DROITS, RESOLUMENT  
41-68 (Pierre Legrand ed., Presses Universitaires de France 2009). 
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course, my violent narrativization is also a means whereby I can account 
for my interlocutor’s utterances). While this tension can be attenuated and a 
lesser violence exerted, it is beyond resolution. Such is the alternative 
economy of meaning: not only does the comparativist-at-law save meaning 
(by taking what is there), but he also dispenses it (by fabricating what there 
is). In the final analysis, this economy is an economy of war, which no 
interpreter can avoid.37 The appeasement that would come with “saving” 
nullifying any role for “dispensing” or with “dispensing” occupying the 
scene completely, thus leaving no room whatsoever for “saving,” is beyond 
reach. One implication following upon these observations is that posited 
law will not be overcome. Indeed, it should not be. 
Of Obliquation 
The traces can be regarded as a supplement to the text understood in 
its graphical dimension, as that which “replaces a lack.”38 Consider the 
taking of a dietary supplement, such as vitamins, which the body may 
require in order to operate optimally as body. My basic goal, then, is to 
redeem the repressed, that is, to put what has been relegated to the exterior 
of law-texts back within the legal so that law-texts can be approached by 
their interpreter in a way which will enable a more edifying interpretive 
yield than has been possible under the aegis of positivism. Arguably, what 
has been deemed superfluous can indeed be shown to count even more than 
what has been said to matter: the traces haunting the words of the statute or 
of the judicial decision can be understood as telling us more about the law 
than an exegesis of these words themselves can ever do, no matter how 
much analyticity one brings to their reading. While the issue is, therefore, 
that of the supplementation of the text in its graphical dimension, there is 
no question of jettisoning that graphical dimension itself or, as far as the 
law is concerned, of doing away with the positivistic aspect of law (a point 
which connects to Derrida’s claim that, as much as metaphysics has 
confined philosophical thought, one cannot do without its concepts, since 
one simply has no language that would escape that history, which would be 
foreign to it). To assert that after “comparative law” has been about the 
posited only―statutes, judicial decisions, and other technical 
paraphernalia―it should now be preoccupied only with traces, would 
simply be reversing the hierarchy, replacing one exclusion with another, 
and showing that comparativists are still in thrall to a simplistic binary 
 
 37. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 220: “One never escapes the economy of war” (“On 
n’échappe jamais à l’économie de guerre”) (emphasis in original). 
 38. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 296 (“remplace . . . un manque”). 
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division, which is always a form of closure. What is required instead of a 
mere inversion is a displacement of the governing paradigm. This motion 
pushes away from simplification towards complexification in the sense that 
comparative legal studies is called upon to transgress dualism and provide a 
resolution of the A-B antagonism through something that is neither A nor 
B. In no way, therefore, ought comparative legal studies to forgo the usual 
legal artifacts, such as statutes and judicial decisions. Indeed, the 
traces―historical, political, social, economic, philosophical, and so 
forth―are precisely to be found at work in statutes and judicial decisions, 
which must therefore remain one of the principal focuses of study for 
comparativists-at-law. Tracing thus appears as a radicalization of legal 
positivism indebted to the very legal positivism which it radicalizes. But 
the posited dimension of law cannot be that at which comparison stops, no 
matter how much technical virtuosity is on display by committed 
positivists. Rather, it must be something from which comparison begins its 
presencing. The idea is to refuse to take statutes or judicial decisions (to 
emphasize two of the most conventional law-texts) only as a posited or a 
given, to reject any idea pointing to the static condition of positivistic 
groundedness, and, through an unceasing movement of oscillation away 
from and towards the posited, to try to see how statutes and judicial 
decisions exist also as the traces that haunt them. In this way, one allows 
that which has never been countenanced within the anterior regime to 
invade the field (since a trace can be erased, repression was possible), 
causes positivism to tremble, and dismantles the received order and its 
violently monistic procedures so as to reveal law’s enculturation and 
expose law qua law-as-culture (in this sense, as it seeks to interrupt and 
remedy a narrative of interdiction, there is no question that the trace and 
the tracing of the trace is a politics). While the legitimation of traces is 
bound significantly to expand the range of information deemed pertinent as 
regards the constitution of law-texts (although there is little doubt that from 
the point of view of the system being questioned, this odd and extravagant 
movement of opening is always going to be reduced to a form of 
miscegenation), it remains the case that not even the enrolment of the traces 
within the comparative enterprise will allow the comparativist-at-law 
ultimately to secure access to the meaning of foreign law, to arraign its 
foreignness. Less abysmal no doubt, his failure will nonetheless prove 
ineliminable for to interpret can never be the same thing as to have access. 
At the very least, though, the comparativist must have traced. 
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About Differance 
As the comparativist undertakes to invent the traces that constitute the 
law-text in order to ascribe meaning to it, he must accept that he will never 
be in a position to do so―not in the sense, at least, of ascertaining a 
meaning of the text that would be fixed and definitive, immobile and 
certain. For one thing, meaning is always postponed. Even as the 
comparativist identifies a trace, he realizes that that trace is not fully 
present since it can itself be traced to another trace (still regarding the 
French statute on religious dress at school, for example, while the text of 
the statute can be traced to the French political unwillingness to recognize 
minority rights, that unwillingness―that trace―can be traced to the 
political philosophy of Rousseau). But this process, being structural to the 
text, is infinite (the political philosophy of Rousseau can itself be traced to 
Sparta, which he adopted as model), which is to say that the text is 
infinitely palimpsestic. Indeed, it becomes impossible to reach an 
originarity.39 In Derrida’s words, “there is no atom.”40 Yet, even if, strictly 
speaking, endless traceability marks the singularity of every law-text, the 
comparativist will have to bring his tracing of this dissemination―his 
“errancy”41―to an end, if only on account of the kind of existential 
compromise that institutional circumstance requires (I have in mind a word 
limit or a submission deadline, not to mention the financial constraints 
confining scholarly mobility). This manifestation of how the will maintains 
itself in the tracing implies that the comparativist will necessarily fall short 
of the full meaning of the text or, to return to the idea of “presence,” that he 
will never succeed in making the text fully present to itself, that he will not 
ensure that the text is, so to speak, at peace with itself. “The” meaning of 
the text, then, will always find itself deferred. 
But there is one other reason why no meaning identified by the 
comparativist can be regarded as “the” meaning of the text, and it is that 
textual meaning will vary with each interpreter.42 Not only, then, is 
meaning deferred but it is also the case that meaning differs according to 
the specific interpreter of the text (the notion of “specificity” being, of 
 
 39. Id. at 233: “[I]t is impossible absolutely to justify a point of departure”  (“il [est] impossible de 
justifier absolument un point de départ”). 
 40. JACQUES DERRIDA, POINTS DE SUSPENSION 147 (Elisabeth Weber ed., Galilée 1992) (1983) 
(“il n’y a pas d’atome”). 
 41. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 232 (“errance”). 
 42. For a famous statement along these lines, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS 
CLASS? (1980). An instantiation of Fish’s striking recantation is at Stanley Fish, Intention is All There 
Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109 
(2008). 
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course, most problematic in the sense at least in which it brings to bear 
matters arising beyond individuality, such as processes of 
institutionalization). Consider this analogy. The old Paris café within which 
I am writing does not mean the same thing to my German friend as it does 
to me and does not mean to an architect what it does to my German friend 
and does not mean to a historian what it does to an architect and so forth. 
To the extent that any of us can be said to “understand” the café, each of us 
does so according to his own lights (again, institutional processes are 
relevant to the matter in important ways: imagine two architects, one 
having studied under Renzo Piano and the other with Frank Gehry). Once 
more, what can be said of a café can be affirmed of a foreign law-text. If he 
understands it at all, a comparativist understands a law-text differently from 
other comparativists (institutional socialization proving significantly and 
ascertainably pertinent to any act of understanding).43 Yet, none of the 
meanings being generated by different comparativists can lay a legitimate 
claim to being “the” meaning of the text. Both the structure of the text (it is 
never fully present to itself) and the structure of interpretation (it is never 
identical to itself) undercut any attempt to fixate meaning. To return to the 
illustration of the café, how could we tell who is “right” about it: the 
historian, the architect, my German friend, or me? The fact is that we all 
bring to bear different perspectives, none of them being “the” true one. 
Indeed, it seems that “truth” has very little to do with the interpretive 
situation. At best, since truth is not a matter of the thing itself but a 
question of words, truth is plural.44 Although Derrida himself took the view 
that “[o]ne must have truth,”45 if there are but truths, any number of them, 
one might arguably do well to renounce the word “truth” altogether; after 
all, is there not more than a touch of the oxymoronic in “truths”? Be that as 
it may, Derrida, in order to capture the infinite motion of a meaning that is 
at once deferred (from the transitive French verb, “différer”) and different 
(from the intransitive French verb, “différer”), coined the neologism 
“differance” (in French, “différance”). Although it sounds exactly like 
“difference” (in French, “différence”), the word is spelled idiosyncratically 
and purports to attest to a process whereby the meaning of a text is 
 
 43. I have in mind a key sentence in the leading text of Gadamer on hermeneutics: “It is enough to 
say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”   HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH 
AND METHOD 296 (2d rev. English ed., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall transl. 2004) (1986) 
(“Es genügt zu sagen, daß man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt versteht”) (emphasis in original). 
Although Derrida was often critical of Gadamer’s assumptions and strategies, I cannot see that he 
would have disapproved of the gist of this particular statement. 
 44. JACQUES DERRIDA, EPERONS 83 (Flammarion 1978) (“la vérité est plurielle”). 
 45. JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 79-80 n. 23 (Editions de Minuit 1972) (“[I]l faut la vérité”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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infinitely-deferred and ever-different, which is to say that, in Derrida’s 
parlance, it is always to-come (it is not there as object, at least not in the 
way in which a pen can be said to be on Casimir’s table at this moment). 
Incidentally, this neologism proved very influential and was received in 
leading French and English dictionaries. 
There is one more point, which is of especial relevance to comparative 
endeavors as they operate across languages. Derrida’s idea of “differance” 
challenges the very possibility of translation or, at least, of a translation 
which could be said to be accurate or correct. After all, if the translator 
does not have access to “the” meaning of a text, how could he be said to be 
translating it accurately or correctly? Indeed, Derrida asserts that “[w]hat 
guides [him] is always untranslatability.”46 He observes that “Peter . . . is 
not a translation of Pierre” and also remarks that “the words deux, two, 
zwei . . . remain bound to a language.”47 And there is no way, no matter 
how excellent the translation, in which singularity can be surmounted and 
misunderstanding/maladjustment effaced. Indeed, because it is inherently 
inadequate, translation does not erase difference: it exacerbates it. What 
there is in the third space where meaning is negotiated, that is, 
deconstructed and reconstructed, is neither, say, the “original” Shakespeare 
in sixteenth-century English, at once authoritative and vulnerable, nor a 
piece of twentieth-century French literature: it is a transacted hybrid, which 
features inherent indeterminacy and irresolution, which is the result of 
intercultural tension and which is the source of further intercultural tension. 
In this regard, Derrida’s view is uncompromising: 
[B]etween my world and every other world, there is initially the space 
and time of an infinite difference, of an interruption incommensurable 
with all the attempts at passage, of bridge, of isthmus, of 
communication, of translation, of trope, and of transfer, which the 
desire for world or world sickness . . . will attempt to pose, to impose, 
to propose, to stabilize. There is no world, there are only islands.48 
 
 46. This passage is taken from the transcript of an interview with Derrida in the MAGAZINE 
LITTERAIRE, (Apr. 2004), at 26 (“Ce qui me guide, c’est toujours l’intraductibilité”). 
 47. JACQUES DERRIDA, PSYCHE 209 (2d ed., Galilée 1998) (1985) (“Peter . . . n’est pas une 
traduction de Pierre”) (emphasis in original); 1 JACQUES DERRIDA, LA BETE ET LE SOUVERAIN  241 
(Galilée 2008) (2002) (“les mots ‘deux’, ‘two’, ‘zwei’  . . . restent liés à une langue”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 48. 2 JACQUES DERRIDA, LA BETE ET LE SOUVERAIN 31 (Galilée 2010) (2002) (“[E]ntre mon 
monde et tout autre monde, il y a d’abord l’espace et le temps d’une différence infinie, d’une 
interruption incommensurable à toutes les tentatives de passage, de pont, d’isthme, de communication, 
de traduction, de trope et de transfert que le désir de monde ou le mal de monde  . . . tentera de poser, 
d’imposer, de proposer, de stabiliser. Il n’y a pas de monde, il n’y a que des îles”). 
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For Derrida, then, “the cruel law of difference” entails that there can 
be no anticipation of agreement in the face of disagreement, that there can 
be only negotiation and its attendant power dynamics, rather than 
dialogue.49 The fact is that one keeps meeting one’s failure to meet the 
other. Yet, even in the face of communicatio interrupta―which is also 
communio interrupta―despite this discontinuity between emitter and 
receiver, against insurpassable semantic lability, Derrida refuses to 
renounce the constitution of meaning. Even as he accepts that meaning is 
always already exposed to the irresistible anarchy of play (the word does 
not connote a game so much as the semantic movement left on account of 
structural plasticity),50 that translinguistic identity of meaning is 
impossible, he actively pleads for translation: “I must translate, transfer, 
transport (übertragen) the untranslatable.”51 How to understand this aporia, 
which, incidentally, brings to mind Robert Cover’s claim that “unification 
of meaning . . . exists only for an instant, and [that] that instant is itself 
imaginary”?52 In this regard, Simone Glanert offers a path-breaking 
reflection on translation in the law as that which must be possible even as it 
is impossible. Displaying thorough familiarity with Derrida’s thought, 
making specific reference to comparative legal studies (it is noteworthy 
that translation has been overlooked by most orthodox comparativists-at-
law, an omission which stands as another indictment of “the system 
functioning as the effacing of difference”)53, she shows that 
localization/circumscription of meaning does not leave comparation bereft. 
But “the play of the world” is such that comparative legal studies has to 
address the hurdle of embeddedness beyond the structure of language and 




 49. See JACQUES DERRIDA, ALTERITES  85 (Osiris 1986). The quotation is from DERRIDA, 
ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 291 (“la loi cruelle  . . . de la différence”) (emphasis in original). 
 50. See DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 382: “[P]lay includes the work of meaning” (“le 
jeu comprend le travail du sens”). 
 51. JACQUES DERRIDA, BELIERS 77 (Galilée 2003) (“Je dois traduire, transférer, transporter 
(übertragen) l’intraduisible”) (emphasis in original). 
 52. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1983). 
 53. See Simone Glanert, Comparaison et traduction des droits: à l’impossible tous sont tenus, in 
COMPARER LES DROITS, RESOLUMENT 279-311 (Pierre Legrand ed., Presses Universitaires de France 
2009); SIMONE GLANERT, DE LA TRADUCTIBILITE DU DROIT  (Dalloz 2011). The quotation is from 
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 38 (“[le] système fonctionnant comme effacement de la 
différence”). 
 54. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 337  (“le jeu du monde”). 
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On the Double Bind 
The interpretive process involves two key sets of constraints. These 
strictures put the interpreter in a double bind (the expression, which 
Derrida presses into service in a variety of settings, is indebted to Gregory 
Bateson). At the outset, the interpreter―in our case, the comparativist-at-
law―is embedded in the culture into which he has been thrown. He is, in 
crucial ways, unable to overcome that horizon. Consider the fact that I was 
thrown into a French language and, therefore, into a binary vision of the 
world. As a Francophone, I experience the world as either feminine or 
masculine. And this apprehension extends to objects. For me, a chair is 
feminine, while an armchair is masculine; a computer is masculine, while a 
printer is feminine. Now, I am not at liberty to jettison this linguistic 
identity. I may choose to learn other languages. I may indeed decide not to 
speak or not to read French ever again. But I cannot make it such that my 
francophony will never have been there, that it will never have constituted 
me into the being that I am as I write today. The same goes with law. If in a 
first-year class in a Paris law faculty I have been inducted into the view that 
there exists, and that there must exist, a firm division between “private 
law” and “public law” (or, more specifically, between “droit privé” and 
“droit public”), and if I have spent a further four years of study acting on 
the basis of this distinction, I cannot simply eradicate such experience 
when at some later point I undertake to take an interest in English law. 
And, whether I am conscious of this fact or not, my institutionalization into 
French law will intrude into “my” interpretive picture of English law—how 
could it not? One implication following upon these observations is that the 
interpreter―here, the comparativist-at-law―must forgo objectivity. 
Indeed, the comparativist must renounce the very idea of “understanding” 
as we commonly approach it. A French lawyer cannot understand English 
law and certainly cannot enter into a dialogue with an English lawyer. 
There is only discord, and all that the French lawyer can hope to 
understand is English law as filtered, for example, through the linguistic 
and legal schemes of apprehension into which he himself has been thrown. 
In other words, what he can access, and all that he can access, is “his” 
image of English law (I hold the word in the tweezers of quotation marks in 
order to recall the matter of institutionalization, which colors the 
particularity of any interpretation). Since he cannot transpose himself into 
someone who speaks from English law’s words, all he has is “his” 
appreciation, which entails that, in the final analysis, the comparison goes 
LEGRAND_PROOF_2 7/12/2011  4:13:27 PM 
2011] SITING FOREIGN LAW 619 
in a circle starting with the self and ending with the self: “Everything given 
to me under the light appears as given to myself by myself.”55  
Thus, when the comparativist articulates an interface between 
“Schuld” in the German law of divorce (or, rather, “Ehescheidung”) and 
“fault” in the Californian law of divorce around, say, the notion of 
“transgression,” the alleged “commonality” is necessarily the speculative 
outcome of his own translations. The tale of “transgression”, then, is the 
narrative receptacle of the tales of “Schuld” and “fault,” themselves the 
receptacles of other tales recounted, for example, by German judges or 
Californian law professors. Prompted by a desire to engage foreign law, 
purporting (violently) to organize disparate information, constructing the 
third space even as it seeks loyally to account for the laws of Germany and 
California, the re-presentational vocabulary “produc[es] difference out of 
incommensurability (rather than equivalence out of difference)”.56 Far from 
erasing difference, the commensurative act redeploys it. And because 
difference thus finds itself multiplied, the fashioning of this hybrid, very 
much a refraction of the comparativist’s power, is shown to be traversed by 
the political. Ultimately, apart from the comparativist-at-law, there is no 
common denominator possibly authorizing the bridging of the gap between 
more than one law in co-presence: the gap is the gap, which is not a 
problem for comparativists-at-law who can recognize and respect the 
differend. Again, comparison does not operate referentially, but 
differentially: it does not refer to a “law-in-itself” to which, somehow, the 
comparativist-at-law could gain access, but to a strategy of re-presentation. 
(These remarks, incidentally, do not mean to denigrate the kind of insight 
that remains possible from a critical distance and, indeed, which can only 
be had from such vantage point: I can affirm, except that I do so on my 
“own” behalf.) 
To those who say that to articulate research in foreign law around the 
idea of “fiction” demeans “comparative law,” which ought to extol 
objectivity, I reply that objectivity is itself a fiction (if a notion whose 
fictionality tends to be denied in unexamining fashion). Importantly, to say 
that the comparativist-at-law cannot be objective is not to suggest that his 
observations will be subjective. As I have explained, his linguistic and legal 
identities, for example, will inevitably play a role in his apprehension of 
foreign law―and these, in significant ways, do not have to do with 
 
 55. Id. at 136 (“Tout ce qui m’est donné dans la lumière paraît m’être donné à moi-même par 
moi-même”). 
 56. Meaghan Morris, Foreword, in NAOKI SAKAI, TRANSLATION AND SUBJECTIVITY xiii (1997). I 
also draw on JACQUES DERRIDA, KHORA 75 (Galilée 1993). 
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“subjecthood.”57 In the event, though, the comparativist will inescapably 
generate a meaning that is “other than” anything that would be “there.” 
But not only is the comparativist operating under constraint, the law 
that he has made into his object of study is encumbered also. Such, then, is 
the other aspect of the double bind. Indeed, the English law of anticipatory 
breach or the French law of promesse de vente also features a history, a 
politics, a philosophy, and so forth. As I have mentioned, this array of 
traces is structural and it is, ultimately, infinite―so much so, in fact, that 
meaning is unsaturable, which implies that any account of the law-text is 
fated to be subtractive (it will be less than what the law-text is in effect 
saying) and that the law-text will always remain the repository of a secret, 
foreover inaccessible in its withdrawal from presence (which, incidentally, 
is the text’s opportunity to have a future as an object of interpretation). In 
other words, the law-text being interpreted can never be ascribed all the 
meaning that it solicits. For example, the French statute on religious dress 
at school means infinitely more than any comparativist can ever say about 
it, and there is not a method in the world that could allow him fully to trace 
the extent of the statute’s embeddedness. In the apt counsel of Samuel 
Beckett, “il y a toujours à écouter” (“there is always something more to 
listen to”).58 Always, then, the singularity of foreign law can be enhanced, 
that is, yet another trace can be identified, still more information can be 
offered about the text. Addressing interpretation, George Steiner points to 
the exorbitance of the sphere of relevance: 
The informing [situation] of any single sentence in, say, Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary, is that of the immediate paragraph, of the 
surrounding chapter, of the entire novel. It is also that of the state of 
the French language at Flaubert’s time and place, of the history of 
French society, and of the ideologies, politics, colloquial associations 
and terrain of implicit and explicit reference, which press on, which 
perhaps subvert or ironise, the words, the turns of phrase in that 
particular sentence. The stone strikes the water and concentric circles 
ripple outward to open-ended horizons.59 
A legal “translation” of this claim might be that: 
 
 57. See DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 335: “The ‘subject’ of writing does not exist if one 
means by that some sovereign solitude of the writer. The subject of writing is a system of relations 
between layers:  . . . mental, society, world. Within this scene, the punctual simplicity of the classical 
subject is nowhere to be found” (“Le ‘sujet’ de l’écriture est un système de rapports entre les couches:  
. . . du psychique, de la société, du monde. A l’intérieur de cette scène, la simplicité ponctuelle du sujet 
classique est introuvable”) (emphasis in original). 
 58. CHARLES JULIET, RENCONTRES AVEC SAMUEL BECKETT  49 (Editions P.O.L. 1999) (1973). 
 59. GEORGE STEINER, ERRATA 19 (1997). 
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It would be unwise . . . to regard anything in Japanese society as prima 
facie irrelevant to the understanding of Japanese law on first setting out 
to get to grips with it. The links between law and language, law and the 
political or social and economic order, law and the history and 
traditions of the country, its codes of morality, its senses of justice and 
the relationship between the legal profession and other professions and 
between legal scholarship and other forms of scholarship, the relative 
standing of different actors in and around the legal system, all have 
their impact on law and its administration and the definition of law and 
legal scholarship.60 
Ultimately, “[t]he world is utterly, thoroughly legal.”61 
Unsurprisingly, then, the comparativist-at-law, or at least the comparativist-
at-law whose life experiences have heightened his sensitivity to difference, 
is afflicted by the suspicion that his analysis is never singular enough (“Il y 
a toujours quelque chose d’absent qui me tourmente,” to quote the 
haunting words of Camille Claudel inscribed on an Ile Saint-Louis building 
in Paris). Yet, there is no possibility of coincidence―in the sense of a total 
or perfect overlap―between the law-text’s singularity and the 
singularization of it being performed by the comparativist as he has the text 
turning within itself to reveal its traces (just like a glove, which doubles 
back on itself to show its other side), a process which Derrida often refers 
to as “invagination,” a term he appears to have borrowed from 
embryology.62 Think, for instance, of “the invagination of an inside 
pocket.”63 
Of Invagination as Justice 
In the same way that no language is ever pure, no text ever consists of 
purely one language. The idea that a law-text, such as a statute or a judicial 
decision, could be exclusively about something that would be called “law” 
cannot withstand scrutiny. There is inevitably more than one language at 
work within a text. For Derrida, then, an (unconditional) law of 
heteronomy must replace the Kantian unconditional law of the self-
determination of the subject. In his words, “[i]t is a matter of heteronomy, 
 
 60. Geoffrey Wilson, English Legal Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 818, 831 (1987). 
 61. THOMAS BERNHARD, IST ES EINE KOMÖDIE? IST ES EINE TRAGÖDIE? (1967), in 
ERZÄHLUNGEN 74 (Suhrkamp 2001) (“Die Welt ist eine ganz und gar, durch und durch juristische”). 
 62. GEOFFREY BENNINGTON, JACQUES DERRIDA 210 (Le Seuil 1991). 
 63. JACQUES DERRIDA, DU DROIT A LA PHILOSOPHIE 497 (Galilée 1990)  (“L’invagination d’une 
poche intérieure”). Another example is the Centre Georges-Pompidou in Paris: “[A]ll the mechanical 
services, as well as structural elements, are exposed. It is like a human body with all its organs and 
systems externalized, including the skeleton.” IVAN ŽAKNIĆ, Pompidou Center 23 (Flammarion 
1983). For a “definition” of “invagination,” see DERRIDA, PARAGES, supra note 19, at 133. 
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of a law come from the other—of the other in [the text], an other greater 
and older than [the text].”64 There is “the non legal or pre-legal origin of 
the legal.”65 Yes, yes. “The trace of the other ha[s] imprinted itself 
indelibly within the innermost part of the own, no matter how it might be 
disguised and covered by new programmes.”66 According to Derrida, the 
fact that, through the trace-as-other, “the other participates originarily to 
meaning” shows that, ultimately, justice is at stake.67 As every text realizes 
the other within itself—as every law-text stands as primordial 
heterogeneity, as the coalescence of historical, political, social, economic, 
philosophical, and other traces showing difference to be always already at 
work within the text—justice requires that difference necessarily be 
recognized and respected, even as any encounter with the other must take 
place in the mode of a non-encounter given that the relation to the other 
adopts, in effect, the form of a “no-relation” on account of the other’s 
ultimate inaccessibility (in the end, the self cannot reach the other: he will 
not close the gap).68 Comparativists-at-law, who concern themselves with 
otherness, are asked to accept that their hyper-responsibility vis-à-vis the 
trace-as-other must “regulat[e] the justice and the justness of [their] 
behaviour, of [their] theoretical, practical, and ethico-political decisions,”69 
to acknowledge that this ineluctable commitment, this indebtedness arising 
from a debt which cannot be cancelled (the other is there and remains 
there), demands an appreciation allowing for the other law’s “irreplaceable 
singularity.”70 
∞ 
“Play,” of course, when “viewed from within rationalist discourse . . . 
seems almost to gesture toward[s] a realm outside value altogether.”71 
Arguably, though, it heralds the liberation of thought from its obsessive 
strategies of containment and preoccupations with categories, concepts, 
definitions, not to mention the shibboleths of objectivity and truth. As one 
 
 64. JACQUES DERRIDA, VOYOUS 123 (Galilée 2003) (“Il y va ici  . . .  d’une hétéronomie, de la loi 
venue de l’autre  . . .  — de l’autre en moi plus grand et plus ancien que moi”). 
 65. JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITIQUES DE L’AMITIE  176 (Galilée 1994) (“l’origine non juridique ou 
pré-juridique du juridique”). 
 66. PETER SLOTERDIJK, DERRIDA, EIN ÄGYPTER 27 (Suhrkamp 2007) (“Im Innersten des Eigenen 
ha[t] sich die Spur des Anderen unauslöschlich eingeprägt, mochte sie noch so sehr unkenntlich 
gemacht und von neuen Programmen überdeckt sein”). 
 67. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 107 (“L’autre collabore originairement au sens”). 
 68. DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE, supra note 24, at 109. 
 69. JACQUES DERRIDA, FORCE DE LOI 45 (Galilée 1994) (“règle la justice et la justesse de nos 
comportements, de nos décisions théoriques, pratiques, éthico-politiques”). 
 70. JACQUES DERRIDA, DONNER LA MORT  77 (Galilée 1999) (“la singularité irremplaçable”). 
 71. ELIZABETH D. ERMARTH, SEQUEL TO HISTORY 143 (1992). 
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twists oneself out of positivism, without ever marking a complete break 
with it, one dissociates oneself from any idea that law can be grounded in 
the unambiguously posited and exhaustively present. The trace, which is 
the other of the ground (it is, properly speaking, an-archical), reveals that 
any alleged grounding of law in the posited has nothing to do with anything 
that would be intrinsic to law and has everything to do with the work of 
individuals determined to make things look so. But there is the play, which 
shows not so much the individual at play as the interpreter being played by 
something which escapes his control. This point is but one implication of 
the focus on the trace, which emphasizes the conditions that must govern 
“meaning-making” as a disseminative and differential process. Most 
importantly, perhaps, tracing, and the comparativist-at-law’s tracing in 
particular, engages in the suspension of the (calamitous) suspension of 
heterogeneity (it acts to interrupt the hiding/repression of otherness that 
legal positivism has been sponsoring) on the understanding, of course, that 
the coming of heterogeneity into the comparation announces but more 
interpretation—more instantiation, more unpresentability, more 
intermittence, more play—which no pretence at synthetic closure—
mediation, communication, sublation, totalization—can overcome.72 
By way of non-conclusion (how could a mere introduction terminate 
anything?), I want to indicate, briefly, what my ever-pragmatic U.S. friends 
style the “take-home” with respect to this argument. To be sure, Derrida 
makes this task particularly challenging, if only because his range of 
intellectual interests was much too extensive for him to pursue only one 
theme. Nonetheless, it is possible to ascertain what can be styled 
“persistences” in his writing. Such a significant preoccupation, it seems to 
me, has to do with the idea of “difficulty.” Derrida was always concerned 
with difficulty, especially with the difficulty of understanding and, 
specifically, with the difficulty of understanding what is manifestly 
complex, such as a text. I take the view, then, that Derrida teaches us how 
there is more to a text than meets the eye (or is it the “I”?). And he instructs 
us also that there is more to interpretation than we have been assuming. 
Since comparativists-at-law are primarily called upon to act as interpreters 
of (foreign) texts, these two lessons should stand us in very good stead 
indeed. Along the way, as he assigns an immense critical capacity to the 
trace, Derrida shows that “negativity is a resource,”73 if only because, 
given no objectivity and no truth, the comparativist-at-law must assume 
 
 72. Here also, I derive insight from Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, The Suspension of 
Suspension: Settling for the Improbable, 15 LAW & LIT. 345 (2003). 
 73. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 381 (“la négativité est une ressource”) (emphasis in 
original). 
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substantial responsibility for his normative (and fallible) elections. To 
accept that he is situated firmly within contingency is for the comparativist 
to begin to take responsibility for his own perspectival appreciations. To 
negative objectivity and truth is, in the end, the way to avoid intellectual 
complacency, which is precisely what engulfs one when one stops thinking 
of one’s re-presentation as a re-presentation and begins to see it as being 
endowed with a transcendental quality that would make it objective or 
which would permit it access to truth (that is, when one turns a provisional 
private vocabulary into a permanent public one). As it allows for ethical 
space―“[t]here is no ethics without the presence of the other”74―Derrida’s 
strategy invites interpretive dispute, enhances agency, and forces the 
comparativist-at-law to defend his views in the course of exchanges with 
other comparativists. The negativity at issue is, therefore, anything but 
sterile. Negativity is assertion (of an alternative): “The artist is active, but 
negatively.”75 It is on account of negativity’s enabling valency that the 
conversation continues. 
It befits comparative legal studies that “theory,” on account of its 
Greek roots, should refer not only to sight but to travel. In ancient Greece, a 
“theoros” was, for instance, someone who went on a pilgrimage to a 
religious festival, embarked on a journey to consult an oracle, or travelled 
abroad for the sake of learning.76 As Jacques Derrida, himself an incessant 
traveller, equips one with a theory of the trace and of the ghost, of 
differance and of the double bind, of the dissolution of the transcendental, 
he makes it possible for the comparativist-at-law to attend to urgent 
instances of concrete comparation away from the (conservative) politics of 
sameness and towards an otherness which, while occult and inexhaustible, 
motivates, calls, and indeed summons him. 
∞ 
In the spirit of a “joyful affirmation of the play of the world,”77 the 
trace reveals the non-linearity and interstitiality haunting the text. It takes 
 
 74. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGIE, supra note 5, at 202 (“Il n’y a pas d’éthique sans présence de 
l’autre”) (emphasis in original). Derrida insists that he does not use “ethics” in the way in which the 
notion has traditionally been deployed. See, e.g., DERRIDA, ALTERITES, supra note 49, at 71: “[R]espect 
for the singularity or for the call of the other cannot simply belong to the domain of ethics, to the 
domain conventionally and traditionally determined of ethics”) (“le respect de la singularité ou de 
l’appel de l’autre ne peut pas appartenir simplement au domaine de l’éthique, au domaine 
conventionnellement, traditionnellement déterminé, de l’éthique”). 
 75. SAMUEL BECKETT, PROUST (1931), in 4 THE GROVE CENTENARY EDITION 539 (Paul Auster 
ed. 2006). 
 76. See generally ANDREA W. NIGHTINGALE, SPECTACLES OF TRUTH IN CLASSICAL GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY 40-71 (2004). 
 77. DERRIDA, ECRITURE, supra note 23, at 427  (“l’affirmation joyeuse du  jeu du monde”). 
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the text beyond stasis, that is, beyond the analytical limits reductively 
allowed by the hard copy, thereby recasting the text as a hypertext whose 
constitution is shown to be the product of an intricate, decentered, structure 
of interactive and interconnected discourses linked through multiple 
pathways in an open-ended textuality where the interpreter, as he pursues 
this or that string of references, as he elects his reading route, becomes, in 
significant ways, the inventor of meaning. The appendix to this essay 
conveys a sense of what comparison à la trace may resemble as the 
comparativist-at-law weaves the threads that are constitutive of the text into 
an argument about reterritorialization featuring inherently indeterminate 
and interminable meaning, as he creatively/critically inscribes the survival 
of foreign law not as a posited, but as a text under way. As such, it shows 
the patrons, merchants, and middlemen of “comparative law” how the 
presencing of the trace, by “giv[ing] signified meaning no respite, no 
rest,”78 wants to mark the emergence into relevance, into licit comparative 
writing, of what could be termed a re-presentation of singularity through 
the trace traceable to another trace itself traceable to another trace . . . 
 
 78. Id. at 42 (“ne laissant aucun répit, aucun repos au sens signifié”). 
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APPENDIX 
Tracing the French Statute on Religious Dress at School 
 
“Statute No. 2004-228 Dated 15 March 2004 Regulating, in 
Application of the Principle of Secularism,79 the Wearing of Signs or 
Clothes Expressing a Religious Affiliation in Public Primary Schools, 
Junior and Senior High Schools” 
 
[“Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du 
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une 




“In public primary schools, junior and senior high schools, the 
wearing of signs or clothes whereby students conspicuously express a 
religious affiliation is prohibited.” 
 
[“Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes 
ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une 
appartenance religieuse est interdit.”] 
 
∞ 
By way of supplement to the usual reading of law as only that which 
is posited, the comparativist-at-law, having made the French statute into his 
object of study, abiding by a sophisticated appreciation of textuality, 
purports to invent articulable traces constitutively haunting the law-text 
through infinitely complex networks of enmeshment—and therefore 
structurally partaking of it as law-text. Illustrative statements of such 
comparativism other-wise, deliberately set in the epigrammatic mode, 
follow. (In a context where other editorial strictures obtained, each entry 
would be developed at length.) As he performs this deployment with 
deconstructive scrupulosity, being aware that no text allows for the 
production of meaning at will, the comparativist-at-law, whose engagement 
 
 79. French has “laïcité,” which carries a local cultural colour that “secularism” fails to convey. 
Indeed, the French language also has words like “séculier” and “sécularité.” These, however, are not 
used in France in matters concerning churches and state. In other terms, there exists a specifically 
French version of secularism bearing a specific appellation. 
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is always contingent and whose account/ascription of significance remains 
unsaturable (and therefore irreconcilable with the idea of a totalized or 
holistic system of meaning), hearkens to law-as-culture and thereby 
militates for the recomposition of the coordinates of comparison away from 
mere positivism, whose yield can only ever be confined to an identification 
of foreign law and not to the requisite understanding of it. Observe that to 
the extent that they would want to resist tracing, casting it as counterlaw 
rather than accepting it as the hyperlaw that it is, perhaps denigrating it as 
some form of contemplative aestheticism mired in unauthorized 
lucubrations, orthodox comparativists-at-law would be objecting to what 
has always already happened. 
The tracing at hand, then, is informed by theoretical commitments 
which, before I turn myself into a sort of Borgesian “hacedor,” I am keen 
to supplement by way of a brief exercise in heteroglossia. For these 
purposes, I have appropriated fragments from five different texts, which I 
now want, no doubt artificially, to exhibit adjacently. 
 
“Come on! Play! Invent the world! Invent reality!”80 
  
“For the point at issue is merely the meaning of the texts, not their truth.”81 
 
“What can one do but speculate, speculate, until one hits on the happy 
speculation?”82  
 
“No one, however special his point of vantage, can get . . . into the shrine 
of the single sense. . . . The pleasures of interpretation are henceforth linked 
to loss and disappointment.”83 
 
“A thousand possibilities will always remain open even as one understands 




       80.  VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOOK AT THE HARLEQUINS!, in NOVELS, 1969-1974 571 (Brian Boyd 
ed. 1996) (1974). 
       81.  BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 88 (2d ed., Samuel Shirley transl. 
2001) (1670) (“De solo enim sensu-orationum, non autem de earum veritate laboramus”). 
       82.  SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE (1958), in 2 THE GROVE CENTENARY EDITION 363 (Paul 
Auster ed. 2006) (“Que voulez-vous, il faut spéculer, spéculer, jusqu'à ce qu'on tombe sur la 
spéculation qui est la bonne”). The English text, a re-writing from the French, is Beckett’s. 
       83.  FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY 123 (1979). 
       84.  DERRIDA, LIMITED, supra note 13, at 122 (“Mille possibilités resteront toujours ouvertes, alors 
même qu’on comprend quelque chose de cette phrase qui fait sens”). 
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- A series of recent judicial, legislative, and political interventions. 
o Decision of the Conseil d’Etat dated 27 November 1989 
o Circular of the Minister of National Education dated 12 
December 1989 
o Report of the Stasi Commission dated 11 December 2003 
- A history of anti-clericalism manifesting itself as early as 1302. 
o Edict of Nantes (1598) 
o XVIIIth-century Enlightenment (Voltaire et al.) 
o Revolution (1789) 
o XIXth-century ultramontanism 
o “Dreyfus Affair” (1894-1899) 
o Statute on separation between churches and state (1905) 
o Constitution of 4 October 1958 
- A Rousseauian conception of “freedom” whereby freedom is 
achieved through the state rather than against it. 
- A cultural idea of “citizenship” whereby “citizenship” is created by 
the state and is premised on the ideas of “universalism” and 
“equality”, thus excluding the notion of “groups” or “collective 
rights” and entailing cultural assimilation to “Frenchness” for all. 
- A “Gallican” glorification of the state manifesting itself by way of a 
centralized state authority and strong state involvement in the 
fashioning of Frenchness. 
- A highly-respected school sector entrusted with the highly-valued 
mandate of instituting French Republican values and designed as a 
“neutral” space beyond the reach of counter-powers (such as the 
church, groups, or the family). 
- An intellectual and spatial organization of French society featuring 
the categorical distinction between the “public” and the “private” 
realms. 
- A growing presence of Islam in France. 
o Demographic significance of the Muslim community in 
France 
 French colonial policy 
 French post-colonial policy 
o Perceived irreconcilability between French Republicanism 
and Islam 
o Fear of Islam/Islamophobia 
 Heightened visibility of the Muslim community in 
France 
LEGRAND_PROOF_2 7/12/2011  4:13:27 PM 
2011] SITING FOREIGN LAW 629 
 Revival of Islamic militancy in Algeria 
 “9/11” (and subsequent terrorist attack in Madrid on 
11 March 2004) 
- A distrust of localism and differentialism correlating with a 
longstanding commitment to a unitary and egalitarian citizenry. 
- A strongly hierarchical society and work environment correlating 
with ascertainable risk-aversion on the part of individuals (and, 
specifically, individual public servants). 
- An openly-expressed desire for sustained state activism. 
- A predilection for the enactment of apodictic statutes purporting to 
ensure fixity of meaning as an optimal instrument of social 
engineering. 
- A predilection for abstraction over casuistry correlating with an 
institutional prioritization of “law” over “fact”. 
- An objectification of women correlating with a longstanding 
conception of manliness translating into a specific approach to the 
conduct of gendered relationships. 
o “Courtly love” (or amour courtois)85 
o Specificity of feminisms, more philosophical/literary than 
political/pragmatic 
- A keen confidence in the French “civilizing mission” (or “mission 
civilisatrice”). 
- A largely hermetic attitude vis-à-vis outside cultural influences. 
- . . . 
o . . . 
o . . . 
- . . . 
- . . . 
o . . . 
. . . 
 . . . 
o. . . 
 
 
 85. For an illustration of the kind of creative and erudite scholarship which, in my view, 
comparativists-at-law ought to have in mind as they proceed to substantiate their research, see PETER 
GOODRICH, THE LAWS OF LOVE (2006). In its author’s words, this text is concerned with “lex 
amatoria.” 
